

# Is it Possible to Construct a Non-Metaphysical Hegelian Concept of Person?

## É Possível Construir um Conceito Hegeliano Não-Metafísico de Pessoa?

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**Abstract:** Although personal being plays an important role in G.W.F. Hegel's (1770–1831) philosophy he never provided a comprehensive definition of personality. Within the framework of his works it is thus possible to formulate different definitions of person and personality, and several conflicting definitions were presented among Hegelians during the 1830s and 1840s. In this paper I examine the role of personality in Hegel's system and discuss the relationship between personality and metaphysics. The question shall be analyzed in the context of various works by Hegel and contrasted with two important precursors of Hegel, I. Kant (1724–1804) and J.G. Fichte (1762–1814). I shall also put the philosophy of Finnish Hegelian J.V. Snellman (1806–81) under scrutiny. The paper will indicate the importance of logic for Hegelian metaphysics and for Hegelian conception of personality.

**Keywords:** Hegel. Kant. Personality. Logic. Metaphysics.

**Resumo:** Embora ser pessoal desempenhe um papel importante na filosofia de G.W.F. Hegel (1770–1831), ele nunca forneceu uma definição compreensiva de personalidade. Dentro do arcabouço de seus trabalhos, é, então, possível formular diferentes definições de pessoa e personalidade e algumas definições conflitantes foram apresentadas entre hegelianos durante as décadas de 1830 e 1840. Nesse artigo, examino o papel da personalidade no sistema de Hegel e discuto a relação entre personalidade e metafísica. A questão deve ser analisada no contexto dos vários trabalhos de Hegel e contrastada com dois precursores importantes de Hegel, I. Kant (1724–1804) e J.G. Fichte (1762–1814). Tentarei também por a filosofia do hegeliano finlandês J.V. Snellman (1806–81) sob escrutínio. O artigo também indica a importância da lógica à metafísica hegeliana e a sua concepção de personalidade.

**Palavras-Chave:** Hegel. Kant. Personalidade. Lógica. Metafísica.

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## INTRODUCTION

The importance of subjective and personal being is undoubtedly one of the characteristics of G. W. F. Hegel's (1770–1831) philosophy. Hegel discusses personality in all contexts, where person has been discussed in traditional European thought (DRÜE, 1976, p. 102–103). These are philosophic-psychological, theological and jurisprudential contexts. His philosophical system is basically a presentation of spirit. Personal, which is higher than mere subjective, is the highest stage of the development of spirit.

In this paper I examine the relation of Hegelian conception of personality to metaphysics. The question, whether one can justifiably present a non-metaphysical Hegelian concept of person, is discussed within the limits of Hegel's works. Hegel's views will also be contrasted with I. Kant's (1724–1804) and J. G. Fichte's (1762–1814) conceptions of personality. Kant and Fichte are the most intimate reference points for Hegel's personality theory.

Additionally I discuss the work of Finnish philosopher, statesman and journalist J. V. Snellman (1806–81). Snellman, who has been regarded as a representative of the Hegelian Centre, dealt with Hegelian conception of personality in his work *Essay on the speculative Development of the Idea of Personality*<sup>2</sup> (1841). Snellman's contribution will be seen as an attempt to provide a comprehensive definition of personality through the speculative method, especially through Hegel's logic.

## THE KANTIAN AND FICHTEAN CHALLENGES

Kant's philosophy presented a fundamentally new critique against the subject metaphysics, whereas post-Kantian German idealism can be seen foremost as a restoration of subject ontology (DRÜE, 1976, p. 83), and Hegel's philosophy as the culmination of this development. Kant commented personality in his *Critique of Pure Reason*<sup>3</sup> (1781, 1787) as one of the transcendental paralogisms. This part of the work criticizes rational

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2 From now on I will refer to this book with The Idea of Personality or IP. For the complete list of abbreviations see the list of references.

3 Kant discusses personality also in his other works (e.g. Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View (1798) and Critique of Practical Reason (1786)) and presents several variations of the concept of person. The moral personality, which is presented in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785), is maybe the most important one. The discussion in KRV is, however, the most interesting with regard to our topic. See also LONGUENESSE, 2007, p. 160.

psychology in general and its way to comprehend person. In third paralogism – the paralogism of personality – Kant addresses the difference between the I and personality.

For Kant the unity of the I is absolute but only logical. This means that the I is *empty* in the sense that it is bound with thoughts:

Yet we can lay at the basis of this science nothing but the simple, and by itself quite empty, presentation I, of which we cannot even say that it is a concept, but only that it is a mere consciousness accompanying all concepts (KANT, KRV, B404).

How can Kant claim this? He points out that although we know that there is the I in every thought we have, we do not have any proof of the permanent objectivity of the I. In other words: the fact that the every thought is accompanied by the I is merely a formal condition for thinking. It does not proof what Kant calls „[...] the numerical identity of myself as subject“ (KANT, KRV, A363). Kant states that subject is X, which can never be grasped as a concept. The statement „I think“ does not include any reference to the existence of subject entity or thinking substance (KANT, KRV, B405, B407). The I „[...] is no more an intuition than a concept of any object“ but „[...] the mere form of consciousness [...]“, what is decisive, then the I „[...] would have to be an intuition that [...] would [...] supply synthetic propositions“ (KANT, KRV, A382). Kant states that he allows the use of concept of personality in practical sense. This concept does not increase our knowledge (KANT, KRV, A366; HUGHES, 1983, p. 407). Rational psychology rests on misunderstanding (KANT, KRV, B421–B422).

In order to understand Kant correctly one must understand that the primary function of the paralogism of personality is a critical one. The great ambition of Kant's philosophy is to present the limits for metaphysics and philosophy in general, and the Cartesian subject becomes ruled out in this process (KANT, KRV, A354–A355). Kantian conception of person is clearly non-metaphysical or at least non-ontological. Kant aims to show that only logical use of the theoretical concept of person is possible. This unity refers to Kant's idea of transcendental apperception, which is valued by Hegel:

It is one of the profoundest and truest insights to be found in the Critique of Reason that the *unity* which constitutes the *essence of the concept* is recognized as the

*original synthetic unity of apperception, the unity of the „I think,“ or of self-consciousness (HEGEL, WL2, p. 515).*

The Kantian challenge presents thus the question, whether Hegel can attribute other characteristics to person than just mere logical unity.

Besides Kant and his idea of transcendental apperception another important reference point of Hegelian concept of person, is Fichte's philosophy. Although in many ways Fichte's philosophy means continuation of Kantian philosophy, it also presents a new way to approach the I.<sup>4</sup> For Kant and Fichte the precondition of all cognition is the I, but Kant said little about this I as such. Fichte focuses – on the contrary – precisely on this I. His philosophy is essentially a philosophy of the self-consciousness and its structure. Fichte's philosophy is thus a study, which within the Kantian standpoint would be impossible (WAGNER, 1971, pp. 39–40). In this and many other regards Fichte's philosophy is an important precursor of Hegel. Fichte highlights the understanding of the I as active in his *Science of knowledge* (1794, 1802):

The self's own positing of itself is thus its own pure activity. The *self posits itself*, and by virtue of this mere self-assertion it *exists* [...]. It is at once the agent and the product of action; the active, and what the activity brings about; action and deed are one and the same, and hence the 'I am' expresses an Act [...] (FICHTE, GWL, p. 97).

Furthermore, Fichte stresses the role of thinking as well as freedom of the I, the unity of thinking and willing, and self-consciousness (RITZEL, 1956, pp. 74–76, 89–90, 107–108) – all of which are important steps towards Hegel's system. On the basis of the theory of self-consciousness Hegel and Fichte end up – however – with divergent results. Fichte, against Hegel, criticized the conception of God or the absolute as a person.

According to Fichte the understanding of God as a person makes him finite. Personality is bound with limitations, whereas God should present a fundamental unity. On what basis does Fichte claim this? He points out that in order to think the I as object in self-conscious act one has already to presume

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4 Within the limits of this paper the relationship between Kantian critical philosophy and Fichte's project cannot be discussed in length. In short, Fichte's project belongs to Kant's generation, whereas Hegel's philosophy joins rather in Schelling's generation. Hegel's philosophy is reaction to Kantian philosophy – not its sequel. With this regard it should be stressed that the standpoint of young Hegel differs from that of late Hegel and resembles clearly the Fichtean standpoint. See WAGNER, 1971, p. 15. In the following I focus on the comparison between late Hegel and Fichte.

the I as a subject. Thus, this being the case, subject does not grasp subject as subject. In order to avoid this, for preceding philosophy crucial problem, Fichte postulates the original self-consciousness (WAGNER, 1971, pp. 41–42). It proceeds from the original identity of subject and object and explains, how the I comes to know about itself as a self.<sup>5</sup>

The original self-consciousness is the self-positing I, which is not personality or individual I. It is the reason, whereas personality is just one way of representing reason (WAGNER, 1971, p. 59). For Fichte personality is thus only one manifestation of the universal self. The universal self speaks out the unity of universality and individuality, whereas personality is just restriction within this unity. The universal self, which exceeds individuality, is the ground structure of personality (WAGNER, 1971, p. 60). Fichte argues that because the universal self is its own cause, it is comparable to God (FICHTE, *GWL*, p. 117). Thus the idea of God as individual personality has to be abandoned. Further Fichte argues that God should not be understood as self-consciousness either (WAGNER, 1971, pp. 111–112). God equals unity, which is alien to human understanding or consciousness.

Fichte challenges thus the possibility to combine personality and the idea of all-unifying absolute. Yet he does not try to label personality as somehow meaningless: he just saw that the category of personality cannot be attributed to God. On the other hand, Fichte can say very little about God as such. God is eventually identified with being: outside God there is only God's appearance (WAGNER, 1971, p. 109).

To conclude: in relation to Kant and Fichte Hegel's philosophical project appears to be restoration of person ontology. Hegel's philosophy is not – as we shall see – a sign of restoration of old Cartesian subject ontology (FULDA, 1988, p. 59), but is based on redefinition of certain principles. Especially through redefinition of logic and introduction of the new concept of spirit Hegel attempts to establish a new rationalist metaphysics (HENRICH, 1988, p. 21), and thus defeat the restrictions for the concept of person, which were presented by Kant and Fichte.

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<sup>5</sup> On the other hand, the self exists only as conscious: „What was I, then, before I came to self-consciousness? The natural reply is: I did not exist at all, for I was not a self. The self exists only insofar as it is conscious of itself“ (FICHTE, *GWL*, p. 98).

## THE CONCEPT OF PERSON

Regardless of the essential role of the personal in his system, Hegel provided an explicit definition of the concept of person only in the context of the philosophy of right.

The universality of this consciously free will is abstract universality, the self-conscious but otherwise contentless and simple relation of itself to itself in its individuality, and from this point of view the subject is a person. Personality implies that as *this* person: (i) I am completely determined on every side (in my inner caprice, impulse, and desire, as well as by immediate external facts) and so finite, yet (ii) none the less I am simply and solely self-relation, and therefore in finitude I know myself as something infinite, universal, and free (HEGEL, *PR*, p. 38 (§ 35)).

Additionally the definition states that the highest of human aims is to be a person and that personality, which is essentially higher than subjectivity, is constituted by self-consciousness (HEGEL, *PR*, p. 38 (§ 35 Z)).

Although the definition is short and abstract, it germinates into the totality of the philosophy of objective spirit. The abstract definition of person constitutes the starting point of philosophy of right, but the personality as such is not discussed any further. Hegel also refers to the definition of concrete personality, which belongs to the subject matter of the philosophy of subjective spirit.<sup>6</sup> However, Hegel never provided this definition before his unexpected death.

The crucial question for this paper is the question, whether it is inconsistent to state that Hegel does not provide a comprehensive definition of personality and at the same time to allege that personality has great importance in his system. I discuss this question in detail in the following chapter. Prior to that, I present few questions, which I hope to clarify the subject matter of this paper.

First decisive question is the question, how the difference between subject and person is to be defined. The definition of person in the philosophy of right mentioned above indicates that there is a difference between the two. The meaning of the word person in ordinary language

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<sup>6</sup> Hegel states in *Philosophy of Right* (1821) that he would like to provide a more comprehensive study on psychology in future. See HEGEL, *PR*, p. 22 (§ 4). This intention was never realized. Psychology belongs to the subject matter of the philosophy of subjective spirit.

overlaps most of the meanings of word subject, and these words are often used as synonyms. On the other hand, the characteristics of Hegelian subject conform the ordinary understanding of person. In fact, the similarity between subject and person characterizes also Hegel's thinking. Hegel addresses human subject in the second part of the philosophy of subjective spirit. The second part is followed by psychology, which is supposed to comprise the definition of personality. Interestingly, psychology treats same phenomena as the second part (FETSCHER, 1970, pp. 132, 136–137). That is not to say that psychology is mere repetition of phenomenology, as psychology is essentially higher stage than phenomenology. How is the difference between the two then to be defined? The phenomenology begins with strict dualism between subject and object, and the discipline shows, how the gap between the two is bridged. The overcoming of this dualism is the starting point of psychology. The dualism is not refuted, but the reconciliation between subject and reality is inherent in person. This clarifies why there is actually no transition between psychology and philosophy of objective spirit or the person of psychology and the person of the philosophy of right (FETSCHER, 1970, p. 219).

Second important question is the question of the relationship between person and personality. Does the distinction between the two bring out something essential? I argue that it does. Personality refers to logic: the concept, which is defined in the last part of logic, is as such personal. Person refers instead to reality: it is more concrete than personality. The concept of person encloses reality. Thus the distinction between person and personality boils down to the distinction between logic and the rest of the system, the so-called realphilosophy.

## **THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PERSONALITY**

Now I shall come back to the question, whether it is inconsistent to claim – on the basis of Hegel's works – that personality truly has great importance for his system. My answer is negative. My argument here is twofold. I will first explain the importance of personality in three areas of Hegel's system: the philosophy of religion, logic and the philosophy of subjective spirit. Second I will present Hegel's answer to Kantian and Fichtean challenges.

Hegel's idea to grasp the reality through one concept – aka the concept of spirit – led already during Hegel's lifetime to the discussion, whether Hegel is supporting pantheism. Hegel, who regarded himself as a Christian thinker, strictly denied this and claimed that his philosophy is compatible with Christianity.<sup>7</sup> Decisive for the true understanding of this claim is to understand that the compatibility of Christian doctrine and speculative philosophy is not the starting point of Hegel's philosophy of religion but the result of it. This is the matter of the examination of history. According to Hegel many central doctrines of Christianity were present already prior to Christianity: for example some pre-Christian religions embraced the idea of Trinity (HEGEL, *VPR3*, p. 29). However, the Trinity gains the absolute status solely in Christianity.

According to Hegel his logic presents the eternal essence of God before the Creation (HEGEL, *WL1*, p. 29), whereas the philosophy of religion has to do with the presence of God:

[T]he logical Idea is God as He is in Himself. [...] in the Philosophy of Religion, we have at the same time to do with the manner of His manifestation or presentation to us; He simply makes Himself apparent, represents Himself to Himself (HEGEL, *VPR1*, p. 25).

The development of logic mirrors hence the development of religion. The last part of logic or the subjective logic culminates with the presentation of concept. The Hegelian concept has three moments: the universal, the particular and the singular. As the concept is the true presentation of spirit, it is clear that the singularity characterizes the highest stage of development rather than abstract universality. So, the moment of singularity indicates the principle of personality (WENDTE, 2007, p. 26–27).

The definition of concept is, however, still abstract. The concept cannot stay in its pureness: it must manifest itself. In the course of the logic the concept defines itself and becomes more concrete. The moments of concept are presented in first part of subjective logic, which is followed by second

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<sup>7</sup> Hegel writes: „Philosophy is thus identical with religion, but the distinction is that it is so in a peculiar manner, distinct from the manner of looking at things which is commonly called religion as such. What they have in common is, that they are religion ; what distinguishes them from each other is merely the kind and manner of religion we find in each“ (HEGEL, *VPRI*, p. 20).



part or objectivity. The last part discusses the idea, which is – according to Hegel – the pure personality:

The richest is therefore the most concrete and the *most subjective*, and that which retreats to the simplest depth is the mightiest and the most all-encompassing. The highest and most intense point is the *pure personality* that, solely by virtue of the absolute dialectic which is its nature, equally embraces and holds *everything within itself*, for it makes itself into the supremely free – the simplicity which is the first immediacy and universality (HEGEL, *WL2*, p. 750).

The idea is the peak of this development and thus personality is granted a key position in Hegel's system.

The pure personality is as such complete. This completeness is yet merely logical. In order to gain full and complete existence the idea has to manifest itself. This movement towards concreteness takes place in Hegel's realphilosophy, and accordingly it is reflected in the philosophy of religion. The concrete personality of God is the outcome of history. That is not to say that the truth of Christian doctrine is relative or non-eternal. God is a person already prior to the Creation or the world history, but his personality is still abstract. The personality of God gains concreteness, as his self-manifestation proceeds:

The spirit is only spirit in so far as it is for the spirit, and in the absolute religion it is the absolute spirit which manifests no longer abstract elements of its being but itself (HEGEL, *EnzIII*, p. 299 (§ 564)).

The understanding of the eternal Christian truth develops thus in the course of history, although this development is not a linear one. For example, understanding the trinity of the Hegelian concept is the precondition for the highest understanding of Christian trinity (WENDTE, 2007, p. 27). The ordinary understanding interprets the Trinity as the expression of three gods, and hence the true nature of the Trinity stays as a secret for understanding (HEGEL, *VPR3*, p. 25). Dialectical logic demonstrates instead that none of the moments of Trinity is truly independent:

Only, in accordance with the nature of number, which is here introduced into the matter, each characteristic gets a fixed form as one, and we are required to conceive of three units as only one unit, a demand which it is extremely hard to entertain, and which is, as is sometimes said, an utterly irrational demand. It is

the Understanding alone that is always haunted by this idea of the absolute independence of the unit or One, this idea of absolute separation and rupture. If, on the contrary, we regard the matter from the point of view of logic, we see that the One has an inner *dialectic* movement, and is not truly independent (HEGEL, *VPR3*, p. 23).

The dialectical resolution, throughout which the division between one and its other is mediated, is further described by Hegel as love. In love both the identity of myself and my identity with the other is present. It seems to me that love characterizes generally the content of the category personality. In ordinary language the notion of personality usually refers to exclusion. On the contrary the singularity of the Hegelian concept, which indicates personality, encloses the two preceding moments as mediated. The true love is possible solely for person, and it is also a proof of the power of spirit. It can overcome the duality between itself and its other. The opposition is not destructive for the existence of spirit.

Another task for Hegel is to explain, how the personality in the philosophy of subjective spirit or the human personality relates to logic and the philosophy of religion. In principle the human I is one instance of the self-manifestation of the spirit. The structure of the I mirrors thus the structure of the concept. Further, both the I and the concept are active and can grasp any possible object (INWOOD, 1992, p. 59). As it was mentioned above, the person has mediated the dualism, which characterizes the subject. This unity stems from the unity of the concept and opens up spheres of freedom and being, which are not possible for subject.

It seems to me that describing personality as love applies also to human personality. In love I gave up my personality – or my abstract personality – and gain it back as more concrete. Also the need for manifestation described above applies to human person: human individual has to participate to the societal activities and struggle for recognition. The possibility of human individual to gain recognition are thus also dependent on the society and the era.

On the basis of preceding remarks we can now explore, how Hegel answers to the Fichtean challenge. Fichte argued that the category of personality cannot comprise God, because it is bound with finiteness. Hegel breaks the bond between personality and finiteness. For him universal and individual are not sharply contrasted with each other: personality is

mediated through universality. For Fichte all individuality refers to exclusion. Hegel – on the contrary – argues for personality, which has universality as a moment. This kind of definition was made possible by Hegelian logic. This is further described in his philosophy of religion as love.

How about the Kantian challenge? For both Hegel and Kant the unity of subject or the transcendental apperception has great importance. However – as we have seen – this unity is for Kant merely a logical one. For him the I is not a concept but just empty representation. This is why it cannot serve as foundation for future reflection. Hegel, on his behalf, identifies subject with concept. Like concept subject is particular. On the other hand, concepts are like sources through which the scope of all the other concepts opens up: one concept has other concepts as negative determinations. Because of rational essence subject can thus grasp whatever concepts – that is objects. One example of object, which Kant declares unknown, is God. As we have seen, Hegel discusses God as a theme of theoretical philosophy, whereas Kant defines God to be only an object of practical philosophy (WENDTE, 2007, p. 44). Like Kant, Hegel treats subjectivity and personality in the area of logic. His definition for logic differs fundamentally from that of Kant's: Hegel's logic replaces the old metaphysics (FULDA, 1988, p. 59). Accordingly Hegel's logic does not ratify Kantian critique against old metaphysics (FULDA, 1988, p. 61).

The essential question is now the question, whether Hegel argues for the existence of thinking soul substance and thus returns to the pre-Kantian standpoint. It seems to me that this question boils down to the question, how one defines the concept of spirit. For Hegel spirit is fundamentally process or activity. As regards person one cannot separate person from his or her actions. They are one and the same (DRÜE, 1976, p. 94). Person is not mere collection of attributes, person sets its own essence. Thus there is no „thing“ called person or subject. This has led Walter Jaeschke to state that spirit is for Hegel a non-metaphysical concept (JAESCHKE, 2011, p. 11). So, it is not plausible to claim that Hegel returns to the standpoint of old metaphysics, although he in some sense seeks to establish the pre-Kantian ideal of philosophical knowledge (ROSEN, 1988, p. 248).

On the other hand Hegel does not play the game by Kantian rules. Hegel does not actually solve the Kantian challenge but rocks the foundations on which it rests. Kant focuses on establishing the possibility of synthetic a

priori knowledge through drawing a line between a priori and empirical knowledge. Hegel does not take this distinction granted but widens the scope of philosophy the way, which from Kantian point of view would mean a return to old metaphysics (ROSEN, 1988, pp. 255, 257). He famously claimed in his *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) that his goal is to show the identity of subject and substance (HEGEL, *PhG*, pp. 22–23). The identity has two sides: on the one hand subject has to become substance; on the other hand substance has to become subject. This process is a mediating process. Subject and substance have some essential similarities, but they also differ from each other in some respects. In the process the dynamical mediateness, which characterizes subject, becomes substantial (WENDTE, 2007, p. 69). That is to say that the spirit is substance and thus absolute (WENDTE, 2007, p. 161). The ontology must be understood as relational and dynamic. With regard to personality the process means that Hegel abandons the idea of person as exclusionary singularity. The subject-substance-identity is the ultimate denial of all dualism.

### SNELLMAN'S CONTRIBUTION

Snellman's *The Idea of Personality* was completed in the early 1840s. At that time the unity of the Hegelian school had broken down. One of the key issues in the 1830s debate among Hegelians had been the exact essence of personality and especially the question, whether Hegel supported pantheism or theism. *The Idea of Personality* proceeds accordingly from the need to define personality more accurately. Snellman's *The Idea of Personality* has no counterpart in Hegel's works. His presentation of spirit follows loosely Hegel's philosophy of subjective spirit, although his argumentation is foremost based on logic.

Snellman sees that the origin of the rift within the Hegelian school lies in the understating of logic. Within the course of the debate the status of Christian dogmas had become questioned by the Left Hegelians. The right wing, on the contrary, proceeded from the conformity of Hegel's philosophy and traditional Christianity and was ready to bend the rules of logic in order to maintain it. Snellman takes the logic to be most fundamental part of Hegel's system. Thus for him remoulding the logic on the basis of

realphilosophy is not acceptable. Snellman stresses throughout *The Idea of Personality* that this is also Hegel's factual standpoint.

In general Snellman's strategy is to stretch the Hegelian logic to its limit and thus narrow the gap between logic and the philosophy of spirit. According to Snellman logic is the true definition of personality (SNELLMAN, *IP*, pp. 215–216). This claim involves several aspects. First, the pure personality, the peak of logical development, encloses the path of logic. Thus the whole of logic explains, how personality can be both universal and singular and thus express the absolute spirit (SNELLMAN, *IP*, p. 271).

Second, human individuality in general is possible solely through thinking (SNELLMAN, *IP*, pp. 232–233). For Snellman being the I is eventually identical with thinking. In thinking it is possible to separate myself from the others in a way, which does not entail exclusion (SNELLMAN, *IP*, pp. 268–269). In thinking, the I sets its own essence and encloses all the others as determinations. Logic is in the very sense of the word immanent and truly accessible to every rational human being (SNELLMAN, *IP*, p. 216). It was mentioned above that for Hegel the subjective spirit is instance of the absolute spirit. Snellman highlights this point: the human individual can reach the standpoint of absolute knowing through speculative thinking. For Snellman, as for Hegel, the essence of God is no secret nor mystery (HEGEL, *VPR3*, pp. 16–17). The thinking makes human individual eventually in certain sense godlike.

Third, Snellman postulates an intimate relationship between concept and the I and expresses this relationship more explicit than Hegel. For Snellman the two are eventually identical and he also defines this identity as the prerequisite of all speculative philosophy (SNELLMAN, *IP*, p. 337). According to Snellman the categories of logic determine the rational human being (SNELLMAN, *IP*, p. 251).

Narrowing the gap between psychology and logic can – however – only take place as one-sided. Hegel emphasizes that logic is not to be psychologized. Thus tightening the bond between logic and psychology is possible only through defining the world as logical (DRÜE, 1976, p. 3; HEGEL, *WL1*, p. 36). If we compare Snellman's presentation of subjective spirit to Hegel's *Encyclopedia* and *Phenomenology of Spirit*, it seems that Snellman stresses thinking at the expense of will. In other words, Snellman stresses the role of intellectual subject: even self-consciousness is based on

thinking. Snellman further claims that Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* is one-sided as it focuses on the practical subject (SNELLMAN, *IP*, p. 253).

## PERSONALITY AND METAPHYSICS

In conclusion, it seems to me that in order to be Hegelian, personality cannot be defined as non-metaphysical. The very reason is that Hegelian personality cannot be separated from logic, whose legitimacy lies in the fact that it is not just abstract but concrete – that is to say not just epistemology but also metaphysics. As Wendte points out, Hegel's logic is meant to take the place of altogether four disciplines: transcendental philosophy, logic, ontology and theology (WENDTE, 2007, pp. 55–58). Each of these plays an elementary role in Hegel's project. Thus the ontological side cannot just simply be dispelled. This does not – however – imply that Hegel's philosophy would signify the restoration of old metaphysics.

On the one hand, logic provides us only the core of personal being. Hegel states that

[p]ersonality expresses the concept as such; but the person enshrines the actuality of the concept, and only when the concept is determined as person is it the Idea or truth (HEGEL, *PR*, p. 183 (§ 279)).

For example, the structure of the I and the structure of the concept mirror each other, but they are not identical. This seems to be the crucial point for Snellman's attempt to constitute the personality through logic. The logical core of personality does not grasp the very heart of Hegel's philosophical project: to comprehend the living reality of the spirit. Prerequisite for being a person is manifestation. I would even say that in some sense Snellman's attempt falls back into Kantian standpoint as it stresses the logical side of personality so much. Also Kantian *I think* presents the intellectual I (INOUE, 1972, p. 6; KANT, *KRV*, B403). This does not mean that Snellman's conception would contradict with Hegel's, but – what is decisive – it also cannot solve the tension, which caused the rift among the Hegelians. For logic and other parts of Hegel's system are not equal: logic alone is the pure science. Logic should demonstrate the necessity of other sciences, but this demonstration can only be pure and conceptual.

On the other hand, it must be acknowledged that Snellman is right, when he argues for the logical core of personality. It is just the logical side of personality, which explains, why the spirit is at the end of its development a concrete person. Another question is, whether Snellman's *The Idea of Personality* could provide some sort of ground for a more concrete presentation of personal spirit. Although possible, it can be seen as a great challenge.

In order to challenge my claim of inextricability of metaphysics and personality one can of course challenge the claim of the logical core of personality. One could, for example, claim that person is just subject, which encloses reality. This would, however, lead to question, whether personality characterizes spirit at all. Logic depicts the eternal essence of spirit, and disclaiming logical definition of personality would seriously diminish the importance of personality in general. This would then lead to question Hegel's claim concerning the same content of philosophy and religion – that is Christianity. This result can hardly be labeled Hegelian.

Another possibility to challenge my claim would open up through questioning the definition of metaphysics (ROSEN, 1988, p. 248). There are obviously a great number of possible definitions available, and there is a good possibility to argue that a non-ontological view of Hegelian concept of personality is plausible. Recently Arthur Kok has argued that one cannot characterize Hegel as metaphysician, as he tried to overcome metaphysics (KOK, 2013, p. 18). With metaphysics Kok refers to that which is independent from our finiteness (KOK, 2013, p. 273). It is crucial that Kok refers to *Phenomenology of Spirit* (KOK, 2013, p. 154), whereas Snellman, for example, aims to unify Hegel's thinking of several of his works. With regard to the subject matter of this paper it is decisive that *Phenomenology* does not discuss personality systematically – only within the context of Roman legal system.

## REFERENCES & ABBREVIATIONS

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