Does Logic Decolonization involve having a Relativistic approach to Logical Principles?

a Philosophical Case for Epistemic Decolonization

Abstract

The concept of “decolonization” has been widely and erroneously used to the point that it has lost its meaning. Whenever decolonization is invoked, there seems to be disagreement between the universalist and relativist camps. While the debate continues, one can barely imagine a middle position where both camps could find a synthesis. So the question that resonates from this is, does logic decolonization involves having a relativistic approach to logical principles? The logical premise is not universal, as this paper acknowledges, because no one has the divine right to declare something to be true or incorrect. According to this paper, relativism, which is universalism’s opposite, does not result in epistemic decolonization because it involves swapping one system for another. In light of this issue, this paper makes the case that logic/epistemic decolonization is necessary, but only if it entails integrating indigenous knowledge with the Western knowledge system.